

ACT2025

COP27 Call to Action



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Ambition

A Call for Greater Ambition with Concerted and Meaningful Action

AT COP27, COUNTRIES NEED TO:

- Decisively acknowledge and respond to the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6).
- Require all countries—especially the G20—to update their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and longterm strategies in a credible, ambitious manner, in line with the Glasgow Pact and the scientific evidence provided by the IPCC Working Group III report, that aligns short- and long-term policy goals with a 1.5°C pathway.
- Through the Work Programme on Mitigation Ambition and Implementation, task developed countries to lead on climate ambition; highlight policy best practices, especially for sectoral action; support energy transitions and fossil fuel phaseout; and ensure economic diversification.

CONTEXT AND RATIONALE

Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) states:

[T]he ultimate objective of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.¹

¹ UN General Assembly, 1994, "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly" A/RES/48/189.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACT2025	Allied for Climate Transformation 2025
AR6	Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
CO ₂ e	CO ₂ equivalent
COP26	2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference
COP27	2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference
COP28	2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GST	Global Stocktake
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MWP	Work Programme on Mitigation Ambition and Implementation
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
V20	Vulnerable Twenty Forum

Building on the UNFCCC and informed by new scientific evidence including a 2015 scientific report from the UNFCCC Secretariat² and the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, the Paris Agreement establishes the following concrete temperature target:

*... holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.*³

As of today, the world is not on track to limit warming to 1.5°C. Total net GHG emissions have continued to rise during the period 2010–2019 across all major GHG types.⁴ While the rate of growth in GHG emissions during 2010–2019 has been lower than in the past decade, average annual GHG emissions during 2010–2019 were still higher than in any previous decade.⁵ In other words, while GHG emissions are growing slower than they used to, they are still growing. In its Sixth Assessment Report, the IPCC identified that global GHG emissions associated with pledges made prior to COP26 would likely cause warming to exceed the 1.5°C threshold by mid-century.⁶ In fact, according to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2022, countries' NDCs or climate pledges made under the Paris Agreement made up to COP26 had the world on a trajectory of 2.4–2.6°C trajectory by 2100.⁷ Even the most optimistic scenario, based off of countries' net-zero pledges, shows that temperatures can rise to 1.8°C.⁸ But even with these pledges, there is a critical implementation gap with policies in place as of the end of 2021 projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by countries' commitments.⁹

2 UNFCCC. 2015. "Report on the Structured Expert Dialogue on the 2013–2015 Review". <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sb/eng/inf01.pdf>.

3 UNFCCC. 2016. "PARIS AGREEMENT (UNITED NATIONS 2015)". https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

4 IPCC. 2022. "Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change". <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/>.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 UNEP. 2022. "Emissions Gap Report 2022". <https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022>.

8 Birol, Faith. 2021. "COP26 Climate Pledges Could Help Limit Global Warming to 1.8 °C, but Implementing Them Will Be the Key". IEA. <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/cop26-climate-pledges-could-help-limit-global-warming-to-1-8-c-but-implementing-them-will-be-the-key>.

9 UNEP. 2022. "Emissions Gap Report 2022". <https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022>.

Even at current GHG emissions levels, the impacts of the climate crisis are severe and lethal. Examples can be found all over the world from the recent heat waves and fires in Europe, to the continuous and worsening droughts in the Sahel and East Africa, to the loss of lives and property from the devastating flooding in Pakistan.^{10,11,12} With the current global warming trajectory predicted to exceed 2°C by the end of the century, the world is on a very dangerous pathway.¹³ Moreover, the IPCC found that every additional increment of global warming will exacerbate climate impacts.¹⁴

Beyond 1.5°C of warming, there are also specific constraints for climate-resilient development. For some regions, especially low-lying coastal cities and settlements and small islands, there are no options if global warming exceeds 2°C.¹⁵ In terms of economic constraints, a study by the V20 estimated that the 55 most vulnerable countries suffered losses of around 20 percent of their GDP between 2000 and 2019. Over that period, V20 countries lost approximately US\$525 billion due to climate-change impacts on temperature and precipitation patterns.¹⁶ But this problem goes beyond economics. As communicated in the latest IPCC report from 2022 on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, the adverse impacts of the climate crisis disproportionately affect the most vulnerable peoples and systems across all sectors and regions, even though they contribute the least to the problem.¹⁷ For many developing nations, including SIDS, LDCs, and other vulnerable nations that did not cause the climate crisis, climate change is not just another challenge, it is a survival and existential threat.¹⁸

In addition to this inequity, which sits at the crux of climate change, the adoption of low-emission technologies lags in most developing countries due in part to weaker enabling conditions, including limited finance due to the cost of capital, ineligible official development assistance qualification, and insufficient fiscal space; the lack of technology development and transfer; and lack of institutional and human capacities. Therefore, it is essential that international cooperation and support be garnered to achieve ambitious climate-change mitigation goals.

Despite the urgency of the climate crisis and countries' agreement at COP26 to phase down coal power and to eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, other issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and escalating energy prices, have distracted from the discussion of climate change and global warming for some governments.¹⁹ Developed nations like Germany, the United Kingdom, and Denmark are reopening some coal-fired plants to meet the shortfall caused by the Russia-Ukraine war or are delaying their closure, which risks locking the world into obsolete and pollution-intensive technologies.^{20,21} Meanwhile, some investors are seeking to seize opportunities in the clean energy sector.²² Addressing the current energy crisis while simultaneously reducing the emissions gap²³ opens new opportunities and can yield multiple dividends.²⁴

Financially, evidence shows that we can close the 2030 emissions gap with mitigation options costing less than \$100 per ton of CO₂e. Some options with large potential in reducing GHG emissions, come from wind and solar energy, energy-efficiency improvements, reduced conversion of natural ecosystems, and methane (coal mining, oil, and gas and waste) with costs below \$20 per ton of CO₂e.²⁵ Studies show that climate-friendly investments are also better at creating jobs. For example, investing in photovoltaic solar energy creates 1.5 times as many jobs as

10 Guy, Jack. 2022. "Europe Reels as Repeated Heatwaves Cause Chaos." <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/11/europe/europe-heatwave-august-intl/>

11 Moseley, William, G. 2022. "The Trouble with Drought as an Explanation for Famine in the Horn and Sahel of Africa, The Conversation." <https://theconversation.com/the-trouble-with-drought-as-an-explanation-for-famine-in-the-horn-and-sahel-of-africa-177071>.

12 Mallapaty, Smriti. 2022. "Why are Pakistan's Floods So Extreme This Year?" <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-02813-6>.

13 Climate Action Tracker. 2021. "2100 Warming Projections." <https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/>.

14 IPCC. 2021. "Summary for Policy Makers. Working Group I." https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf.

15 IPCC. 2022. "Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change." https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Final_FullReport.pdf.

16 V20. 2022. "Climate-Vulnerable Economies Loss Report." <https://www.v20.org/resources/publications/climate-vulnerable-economies-loss-report>.

17 Please refer to ACT2025's chapters on Adaptation and on Loss & Damage for further discussion on the impacts of the climate crisis.

18 IPCC. 2022. "Summary for Policymakers. Working Group II." https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf.

19 Birol, Faith. 2022. "What Does the Current Global Energy Crisis Mean for Energy Investment?" <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/what-does-the-current-global-energy-crisis-mean-for-energy-investment>.

20 Reuters. 2022. "Germany's Uniper to Restart Coal-Fired Power Plant as Gazprom Halts Supply to Europe." <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-uniper-bring-coal-fired-power-plant-heyden-4-back-onto-electricity-2022-08-22/>.

21 Reuters. 2022. "Britain to Keep Coal-Fired Power Plants Open This Winter." <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/britain-keep-coal-fired-power-plants-open-this-winter-2022-07-29/>.

22 Mathis, Will. 2022. "Money Flows to Green-Energy Funds amid Vows to Cut Russian Fuels." <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-14/money-flows-to-green-energy-funds-amid-vows-to-cut-russian-fuels>.

23 That is, the difference between current GHG emissions projections under the current NDCs and emissions levels needed in 2030 to be on course toward limiting warming to below 2°C or further to 1.5°C. (Adapted from Emissions Gap Report, 2021).

24 World Economic Forum. 2022. "Clean Energy Investing: Global Comparison of Investment Returns." <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/energy-crisis-investment-renewable-energy-developing-economies/>.

25 IPCC. 2022. "Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change." <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/>.

fossil fuels per \$1 million.²⁶ Furthermore, the avoided negative health impacts from transitioning to a low-carbon economy would also be substantial.²⁷ According to the IPCC, the climate crisis has a significant impact on physical and mental health.²⁸ The World Health Organization estimated that the climate crisis will cause 250,000 extra deaths a year in health costs by 2030.²⁹

With so much to lose with inaction and yet so much to gain with decisive action, global leaders must use COP27 to show their commitment to urgent, ambitious, on-the-ground climate solutions that place the world on a path to no more than 1.5°C of warming.

THREE AREAS FOR URGENT ACTION

At COP27, there three key areas for urgent action that the international community must undertake:

Decisively acknowledge and respond to AR6

The global community must start by acknowledging the AR6 findings, as discussed earlier. Global decision-making must be anchored in the best available science, and the IPCC is the premier international body for climate science. The outcomes from AR6 are essential not just for mitigation, but for adaptation, loss and damage, and finance as well.

Beyond acknowledging IPCC reports and their findings, the international community must then decisively act. The science in AR6 is unequivocal: In a scenario where we limit warming to 1.5°C, global emissions must peak before 2025 and then decline to 43 percent below 2019 levels by 2030.³⁰ While countries pursue the implementation and enhancement of their adaptation and finance commitments and obligations, the avoidance and reduction of GHG emissions remains vital. Rapid acceleration of mitigation efforts across all sectors is indispensable for achieving the temperature target.

Governments must do more, both in terms of setting the enabling environment and in the allocation of the requisite resources and effort to meet a 1.5-degree pathway. Of course, this includes reducing GHG emissions from energy and all other sectors, including agriculture, forestry and other land use, urban systems, buildings, transportation, and industry, and enhancing the deployment of carbon capture and storage to address residual emissions that cannot be eliminated. But this also includes other interventions, such as using an understanding of behavioral science to help in efforts to shift consumption patterns among the world's wealthiest, who account for 36–45 percent of global emissions, which could lead to 40–70 percent emissions reduction by 2050.³¹ Furthermore, every effort must be made to establish synergies between mitigation options and the sustainable development goals.

Efforts must also go beyond carbon dioxide to include other GHGs, especially short-lived carbon pollutants, like methane, which often have a much more intense warming effect despite their shorter life span. Over 20 years, methane has more than 80 times the warming potential of CO₂.³² Therefore, methane reductions have enormous potential in the short term for achieving the temperature goal set in the Paris Agreement.

Removing fossil fuel subsidies, and channeling these funds and resources to more sustainable and cleaner forms of energy production, is essential to achieving emissions reductions.³³ The IPCC estimated that removing fossil fuel subsidies can reduce global GHG emissions by up to 10 percent by 2030.³⁴ For instance, according to new OECD

26 Jaeger, Joel, Ginette Walls, Ella Clarke, Juan Carlos Altamirano, et al. 2021. "The Green Jobs Advantage: How Climate-friendly Investments Are Better Job Creators?" <https://www.wri.org/research/green-jobs-advantage-how-climate-friendly-investments-are-better-job-creators> DOI: <https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.20.00142>.

27 IPCC. 2018. "Summary for Policymakers." https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2022/06/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf.

28 IPCC. 2022. "Summary for Policymakers. Working Group II." https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf.

29 WHO. 2021. "Climate Change and Health." <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health>.

30 IPCC. 2022. "Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change." https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Final_FullReport.pdf.

31 IPCC. 2022. "Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change." https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Final_FullReport.pdf.

32 Climate and Clean Air Coalition and UNEP. 2021. "Global Methane Assessment." <https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/resources/global-methane-assessment-full-report>.

33 According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2020 globally, fossil fuel subsidies were \$5.9 trillion or 6.8 percent of GDP and are expected to increase to 7.4 percent of GDP in 2025 as the share of fuel consumption in emerging markets (where price gaps are generally larger) continues to climb. Just 8 percent of the 2020 subsidy reflects undercharging for supply costs (explicit subsidies) and 92 percent for undercharging for environmental costs and forgone consumption taxes (implicit subsidies).

34 IPCC. 2022. "Summary for Policy Makers. Working Group III." https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_SPM.pdf.

and International Energy Agency (IEA) data, government support for fossil fuel subsidies in 51 countries amounted to \$697 billion in 2021.³⁵ Reallocating these funds could both contribute to free up the necessary finance needed to support a global just transition while also reducing global emissions.

Of course, such a reallocation of funding and subsidies and programs to avoid and reduce emissions would need to be underpinned by socially inclusive phase-out plans within the context of just transitions. Decreasing and alleviating the impacts of mitigation policies while further exploring and capitalizing on their opportunities is essential for achieving justice and equity and for enabling even deeper mitigation actions.³⁶

For example, the impacts of rising fuel prices have disproportionate impacts on low-income and other marginalized communities. Actions to address climate change also raise a number of challenging and difficult questions around employment for some LDCs and countries whose economies are heavily dependent on fossil fuel production. A low-carbon transition has the potential to displace some jobs, many in the informal sector,—but studies have also shown that, dollar-for-dollar, investments in clean technology have been more lucrative in job creation in various countries.³⁷

The key will be creating tailored just transition plans for different demographics based on need as well as social dialogue and stakeholder consultation. For example, young workers will need access to reskilling and upskilling programs, older workers will need access to functional social safety net programs, and women will need access to safe and secure working conditions. Pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C are expected to be more robust, sustainable, and supported where there are considerations of equity and justice in national priorities.³⁸

Require all countries, especially the G20, to update their NDCs and long-term strategies in a credible, ambitious manner, in line with the Glasgow Pact and the scientific evidence provided by the IPCC Working Group III report that aligns short- and long-term policy goals with a 1.5°C pathway.

It is essential that the major emitters, particularly the G20, who represent together almost 75 percent of global GHG emissions, significantly reduce their emissions.³⁹ To advance on achieving the 1.5°C goal, leadership from the G20 countries is crucial, especially given their outsized contributions to emissions. For comparison, in 2019, the 46 LDCs were estimated to have collectively emitted 1.1 percent of global GHG emissions, excluding CO₂ from land use, land use change and forestry.⁴⁰ In other words, even if LDCs were able to deliver the highest possible ambition, their impact in terms of emissions would be much smaller than those of other major emitters. In fact, if all G20 members were to adopt mid-century net-zero commitments and align their NDCs with a 1.5°C pathway, end-of-century global warming could be limited to 1.7°C and could collectively help to close three-quarters of the temperature gap, keeping 1.5°C within reach.⁴¹

Credibility, however, needs to be enhanced. Rather than rhetoric and platitudes, what's needed is strong political will that supports the necessary actions and investments to drive the implementation of commitments. Similarly, solutions that are quick fixes and low-hanging fruit should be complemented by long-term commitments that drive system transformation. Major emitters and economies must design and follow credible pathways, including near-term targets in NDCs, aligned with limiting global temperature increase to below 1.5°C and achieving net-zero targets by 2050.

35 OECD and International Energy Agency. 2022. "Support for fossil fuels almost doubled in 2021, slowing progress toward international climate goals, according to new analysis from OECD and IEA". <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/support-for-fossil-fuels-almost-doubled-in-2021-slowing-progress-toward-international-climate-goals-according-to-new-analysis-from-oecd-and-iea.htm>.

36 IPCC. 2022. "Summary for Policymakers Working Group III." https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_SPM.pdf.

37 Jaeger, Joel, Ginette Walls, Ella Clarke, Juan Carlos Altamirano, et al. 2021. "The Green Jobs Advantage: How Climate-friendly Investments Are Better Job Creators?" <https://www.wri.org/research/green-jobs-advantage-how-climate-friendly-investments-are-better-job-creators> DOI: <https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.20.00142>.

38 World Resources Institute. 2022. "About Just Transitions." <https://www.wri.org/just-transitions/about>.

39 Srouji, Jamal, Clea Schumer, Claire Fyson, Andreas Geiges, and Matthew Gidden. 2021. "Closing the Gap: The Impact of G20 Climate Commitments on Limiting Global Temperature Rise to 1.5°C." Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/research/closing-the-gap-g20-climate-commitments-limiting-global-temperature-rise>.

40 UNCTAD. 2021. "Smallest Footprints, Largest Impacts: Least Developed Countries Need a Just Sustainable Transition." <https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/chart-october-2021>.

41 Srouji Jamal, Clea Schumer, Claire Fyson, Andreas Geiges, and Matthew Gidden. 2021. "Closing the Gap: The Impact of G20 Commitments on Limiting Global Temperature to Rise to 1.5°C." Working Paper. Washington DC: World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/research/closing-the-gap-g20-climate-commitments-limiting-global-temperature-rise#:~:text=The%20analysis%20finds%20that%20if,%C2%B0C%20goal%20within%20reach.>

The consortium therefore calls for major emitters to significantly strengthen their 2030 emissions-reduction targets and long-term low-emissions development strategy by COP27 to move toward net zero by mid-century. This could include adding or strengthening sectoral and non-CO2 targets in their NDCs. At the same time, all the transitions and transformations linked with mitigation efforts need involvement and bold action from the private sector, including achieving net zero by 2050 but also more meaningful, ambitious, and accountable reductions in the next several years and in the decades before 2050. The need to strengthen short- and long-term targets and to involve the private sector must be part of the messages and concerted effort pursued at COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt.

Through the Work Programme on Mitigation Ambition and Implementation, task developed countries to lead on climate ambition; highlight policy best practices, especially for sectoral action; support energy transitions and fossil fuel phase-out; and ensure economic diversification.

Recognizing the urgent need to cut emissions and the gaps in climate action implementation and ambition, countries decided to establish the MWP. While the specific components and direction of the MWP were left to be defined at COP27, the MWP was established to try to get the international community back on track toward a 1.5-degree pathway, especially in light of the IPCC's Working Group III. This report highlighted that net global emissions were projected to decrease by only 27 percent below 2019 levels by 2030 despite the same report's finding that net global emissions needed to be reduced by 43 percent below 2019 levels by 2030 in order to stay consistent with a 1.5-degree pathway.⁴²

Negotiations to flesh out the MWP began at the intersessional negotiations hosted in Bonn, Germany, in June 2022. The components up for negotiation included timeline, modalities, structure, format, and outcomes of the MWP. The June negotiations highlighted two distinct visions for the work program. One view suggested that the MWP could look at sectors and identify actions that could decarbonize systems in the economy. Some of those with this view advocated that major emitters need to take the lead on this transformational action. The other view proposed the MWP as a space for countries to exchange on opportunities and challenges in climate action.

Ultimately, any progress in these negotiations were scrapped in the end and countries will need to resume talks at COP27, starting from scratch. However, with the ever-increasing urgency of ambitious climate action, resolution of how the MWP should be rolled out will be a key outcome for this conference.

At COP27, countries need to agree to an ambitious MWP that has the clear objectives of helping countries implement their NDCs and achieving a reduction in net global emissions of 43 percent below 2019 levels by 2030 in line with the IPCC. Informed by the IPCC, the MWP should provide a space to further discuss and act upon the necessary shifts in development pathways and transitions for the world's major economic systems to align with keeping a 1.5-degree pathway alive and showcase opportunities for climate action and strengthened cooperation among countries and the engagement of non-state stakeholders.

In addition to agreeing on the objective of the MWP, countries must be clear on the modalities, structure, and timeline for this work program, crafting a space where stakeholders can discuss opportunities for sectoral and thematic action in this critical decade. Countries can pull from the IPCC to determine which sectors need action and should fall under the purview of this work program. This includes energy; agriculture, forestry and other land use; urban systems; buildings; transportation; and industry. Through these discussions, the MWP must drive granular, on-the-ground action, including but not limited to inefficient subsidies and phasing down coal, methane, and so on, all within the context of a just transition. In recognition of this critical decade, countries must also define a timeline that goes through 2030 to provide continuous support until the world is on track for a 1.5-degree pathway.

Lastly, through the work program, countries must call on all stakeholders—including government and non-state actors such as civil society, experts and the private sector—to participate in these key decarbonization activities. To help coordinate non-country stakeholders, countries can call on the Marrakech Partnership and the High-Level Champions, similar to other processes such as the GST.

However, major emitters will need to take the lead on reducing global emissions, and developed countries will also need to mobilize high quality finance to enable a just transition in developing countries under the MWP. Such finance would support vulnerable states in also taking steps to transition to low-carbon economies as

42 IPCC. 2022. "Summary for Policy Makers. Working Group III." https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_SPM.pdf.

an integral step in building climate resilience and in avoiding trade-offs with sustainable development goals.⁴³ Through the MWP, countries will hopefully be able to strengthen multilateral cooperation to achieve a 1.5-degree pathway this decade.

It is important to note that some countries have expressed concern that the MWP should not duplicate the GST.⁴⁴ While this is a fair concern, the MWP is indeed distinct but will necessarily serve as a complement to the GST. Where the GST is mainly a political process and will be more holistic and overarching, the MWP can be more technical and provide direct support to government ministries to be able to realize sectoral decarbonizations actions within their jurisdictions. Furthermore, these two processes can and should build off one another. For example, if countries agree to a sectoral approach to the MWP, that could serve as a useful signal and input for the GST process. Similarly, the outcomes of the GST at COP28 in 2023 can inform the actions taken under the MWP.

CONCLUSION

Any further delay in concerted anticipatory global climate action will miss a brief and rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a livable and sustainable future for all. But the urgency for action cannot come at the cost of climate justice, which must remain at the heart of all action. Major emitters must take the lead on emissions reductions, and developed countries must also mobilize the necessary climate finance to empower vulnerable nations in their own transitions. Furthermore, international negotiations need to facilitate just transitions at the national and subnational levels.

The cumulative scientific evidence is unequivocal: Climate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health. The time for enhanced action on cutting emissions levels is now!

⁴³ United Nations. 2019. "Climate Finance: Financing Climate Action." <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/raising-ambition/climate-finance>.

⁴⁴ For further information on the GST, please refer to the chapter "A Call for Enhanced Implementation of the Rulebook."



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